The case for a common European refugee policy. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚8 | 2017 by Bordignon, Massimo & Moriconi, Simone
Massimo Bordignon 
(massimo.bordignon@
bruegel.org) is a Non-
Resident Fellow at Bruegel 
and a professor at the 
Catholic University of Milan
Simone Moriconi 
(simone.moriconi@unicatt.
it) is an assistant professor 
at the Catholic University of 
Milan
Executive summary
Legal and political issues left the management of the 2015-16 refugee crisis mostly in 
the hands of national governments, but this is incompatible with an integrated  economic 
area that has largely abolished internal borders. It is also incompatible with some founding 
European Union principles, such as the existence of a common European policy on the 
mobility of people.
A greater role for European institutions and policies is needed both for policing the 
common borders and imposing common welcome policy standards for refugees, based 
on best practices. EU measures are also required to face the long-term problems related to 
immigration, as it is very likely that economic and demographic differences between the EU 
and neighbouring countries will lead to further crises in the future. Planning for this requires 
ample and dedicated resources, and a long-term strategy based on agreements with immi-
grants’ countries of origin, a task that no EU country can pursue alone.
Some progress has been made to strengthen the role of the EU, with the adoption of new 
directives, such as the Asylum Procedures Directive, and the establishment of the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency. However, the situation is still far from satisfactory. There are 
major differences in refugee welcome and integration policies in EU countries, as shown by 
differences in asylum request outcomes in different countries and the different integration 
processes. There is also a serious lack of information about the skills and competences of 
refugees in different countries. This is a problem because this information is a necessary first 
step for an integrated welcome policy that might transform a challenge into an opportunity 
for aging European economies.
Such differences between EU countries are not only inequitable but also inefficient. 
They lead to massive distortions in the functioning of European labour markets and create 
incentives for refugees to seek asylum in specific countries. Moreover, the promise made by 
EU institutions of a refugee relocation programme is presently not being kept, leaving the 
countries of first entry to carry disproportionate burdens. Legal procedures are part of the 
problem because the Dublin Regulation, approved under different circumstances, obliges the 
first-entry country to examine asylum requests. However, political obstacles play the main 
role. EU countries are very different in terms of their cultural attitudes towards immigration 
and it is difficult to impose a common solution on them. Practical solutions, based on the 
countries that do not want refugees making compensation payments, are probably the most 
realistic avenues to follow.
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Introduction
In recent years, wars and conflict in the Middle East and sub-Saharan African countries have 
led an unprecedented number of refugees to come to Europe. In 2015, the number of first-
time asylum applicants exceeded 1.2 million, compared to about half a million the previous 
year. By the second half of 2016, the crisis seemed to have abated, thanks to a great extent to 
a European agreement signed in March 2016 with Turkey that allowed Greece to return all 
new irregular migrants to Turkey in exchange for money and easier immigration to Europe for 
Turkish nationals1. 
The deal raised ethical and legal concerns, but it certainly has been successful (so far) in 
reducing the pressure on the eastern route to central Europe. However, the problem is still 
mounting elsewhere. In Italy, the number of arrivals in the first ten months of 2016, about 
160,000 people, was 13 percent higher than in all of 2015. Moreover, people kept dying. In 
the first ten months of 2016, about 5,000 migrants died trying to reach Europe, 3,700 in the 
Mediterranean alone.
The refugee crisis has put strain on border control, policing and the institutions in the 
affected European countries that process refugees. It has also been costly, in particular for 
fiscally constrained countries. However, if addressed cooperatively at the European level, the 
numbers of refugees and the allocation of resources seem to be entirely manageable for a 
wealthy continent of almost 500 million people. Flows of people have increased, but they are 
still of the same order of magnitude of the immigration flows that different European coun-
tries have successfully faced in the last decade.
Nevertheless, the crisis has highlighted the difficulty for European countries and European 
Union institutions to come up with common solutions. The sharing of the burden of process-
ing asylum applications is still a key source of controversy at EU level. By December 2016, 
more than a year after the EU promised to relocate 160,000 refugees from Greece and Italy to 
other EU countries, a permanent home had only been found for 8,162 people, according to 
the European Commission (2016a). Part of the problem is the inadequacy of the existing legal 
framework defined by the Dublin Regulation2. Originally introduced to address individual 
asylum claims, it has proved ineffective in handling a mass influx of displaced persons. It has 
also imposed an excessive burden on the countries of first entry that, under the Regulation, 
must examine asylum requests. Attempts to revise the Dublin Regulation have so far failed.
The EU responded to the refugee crisis by allocating additional resources, creating specific 
agencies and introducing a European Border and Coast Guard Agency. It also attempted to 
further harmonise asylum procedures through the Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/
EU), which entered into force in July 2015, and through EU agencies such as the European 
Asylum Support Office. However, EU intervention has not been successful in sharing the 
responsibility for asylum seekers between member states. 
Notwithstanding current European regulations, major differences between countries 
remain in terms of their welcome and integration policies for refugees. Furthermore, the 
European Commission’s decision to relocate refugees from the EU countries most affected3 
has been resisted by many member countries, particularly in eastern Europe. One of the 
1 See EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releas-
es/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.
2 The purpose of the Dublin Regulation (No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003), is to determine which state is respon-
sible for examining an asylum application – normally the state where the asylum seeker first entered the EU – and 
to make sure that each claim gets a fair examination in one member state. The Dublin system operates on the 
assumption that, as the asylum laws and practices of EU states are based on the same common standards, asylum 
seekers can enjoy similar levels of protection in all EU countries. In reality, asylum legislation and practices still 
vary widely from country to country, causing asylum seekers to receive different treatment in different EU coun-
tries.
3 This was part of a 2015 European Commission package of proposals to address the refugee crisis; see Commission 
press release of 9 September 2015: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm.
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obstacles to the enforcement of migration policies coordinated at the EU level is legal: is 
passing the responsibility for asylum requests to EU supra-national authorities compatible 
with member states’ human rights obligations? In the current legal and institutional frame-
work, migration and asylum policies are essentially domestic issues and it is not clear to what 
extent EU member states, even if willing to do so, could pass their decision-making powers to 
supra-national EU institutions (Carrera and Guild, 2017). This fundamental problem of sover-
eignty has been exacerbated by the rise of populist, right wing and anti-immigration political 
parties in many countries, deterring member states from giving up those powers in favour of 
broader European policies.
However, there seems to be no alternative to attempting to build a common European 
approach to the crisis. Border control, security and unified management of asylum systems 
are obvious public goods for an integrated area such as the EU that has largely abolished 
internal borders. Countries acting independently are very unlikely to offer these public goods 
efficiently. Joint policing of borders, pooling of resources and common rules for asylum seek-
ers are necessary ingredients to avoid opportunistic behaviour by EU countries. Furthermore, 
the problem is not going to disappear, whatever the outcome of the Syrian conflict – the main 
current conflict leading refugees to seek entry to Europe. Unsettled political conditions in 
many countries neighbouring Europe might lead to a new refugee crisis in the next future. In 
any case, the different economic and demographic dynamics in Europe and in neighbouring 
continents are bound to increase migration pressures in the decades to come.
To address these problems, Europe needs develop a legal and institutional framework, 
featuring an integrated approach, both for the short-term – such as the present refugee crisis 
– and the longer term. If well managed, immigration from foreign countries might also offer 
positive economic opportunities for European countries that have aging populations and 
that need to finance vast social welfare systems. For asylum seekers, this specifically requires 
effective policies and best practices that favour integration and prevent human capital 
depreciation. These practices should be monitored and supported by the EU in any country 
involved, taking stock of the successful experience from some countries. This Policy Contri-
bution discusses the needs for a European migration policy, and considers where more policy 
coordination is actually needed. 
The refugee crisis
Inflows of asylum seekers to Europe increased in the first decade of the 2000s, particularly so 
after 2005. The increase was marked in countries such as Germany and Italy, much less so in 
Belgium, Austria and Spain (Figure 1 on the next page). This is even more evident when look-
ing at the growth rates of asylum applications. Countries such as Germany, Denmark, Sweden 
and Italy were characterised by cumulated growth rates well above 50 percent from 2003 to 
2013. For some other countries (France, Greece and the Netherlands) inflows were roughly 
constant (ie growth rates close to zero). Other countries, notably Austria, Belgium and Spain, 
even saw a reduction in the number of asylum seekers between 2003 and 2013 (Table 1 on the 
next page).
It is in this context that the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ – a consequence of the changed 
geopolitical situation arising from the Syrian civil war and the uprisings that followed the 
Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East – started. In 2015, the number of first-time 
asylum applicants in the EU exceeded 1.2 million, more than doubling compared to the 
previous year. All the main EU countries, with the exception of France, experienced a growth 
rate of over 100 percent in the inflow of asylum seekers from 2013-15, touching 300 percent 
in Germany and Austria. Eurostat (2017) suggests that in 2016 the crisis was still ongoing, 
although at a reduced tempo after the agreement with Turkey. For instance, in the third 
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quarter of 2016, more than 280,000 people requested asylum in the EU, double the number in 
the same quarter of 2015 (Eurostat, 2017). 
Figure 1: Inflow of asylum seekers (first-time requests) into selected European 
countries (thousands)
Source: Bruegel based on data from OECD International Migration Outlook 2015.
Table 1: Inflow of asylum seekers, growth rates (first-time requests), selected 
European countries
Source: Bruegel based on data from OECD International Migration Outlook 2015 and Eurostat.
Where do these asylum seekers come from? Making a general statement is impossible. The 
composition by origin of inflows of asylum seekers into the European Union has continuously 
changed over time, depending on the main geopolitical developments taking place inside and 
outside Europe. There was a remarkable change in the composition of the inflows by nation-
ality between 2014 and 2015, triggered by the Syrian crisis (Figure 2). Higher numbers of 
applicants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, and to a lesser extent from Albania and Kosovo, 
were the main contributors to the increase in the number of asylum seekers.
Such a large and sudden inflow of people of course might create serious problems in 
terms of welcome and integration policies. An important issue is the cultural values, skills 
and abilities of these newcomers, many of whom will find a permanent placement in an EU 
country. For instance, the economic literature is broadly positive on the effect of immigration 
on the economies of receiving regions4. Immigrants are typically shown to be complementary, 
4 See for instance Dustmann et al (2016) for a review and evaluation of the different approaches to the analysis of the 
economic impact of migration.
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rather than substitutes, on labour markets, doing jobs that the natives no longer want to do. 
Immigrants, being typically younger than natives, also help to finance the welfare states of 
receiving countries. However, this refers to economic migrants, who probably already had the 
skills, or had made an investment, to become employable in the receiving countries. Refugees 
are different, although even in this case, those who attempt the dangerous trip to Europe are 
a self-selected minority of the total number of displaced people5. Having a precise idea of the 
competences of these newcomers would be very useful to guide integration policy.
Figure 2: Countries of origin of non-EU asylum seekers in the EU, 2014 and 2015
Source: Eurostat, Asylum Statistics, 2017. Note: thousands of first-time applicants. * China includes Hong Kong.
Table 2: Migrants and asylum seekers: gender and age composition, selected 
countries
Country Total
of whom:
0-14 14-17 18-34 Females
Immigrants in 2014        
Spain 305,454 14% 4% 42% 50%
France 339,902 17% 3% 51% 52%
Italy 277,631 13% 3% 47% 50%
Extra-EU refugees in 2014        
Spain 5,615 17% 4% 56% 32%
France 64,310 19% 3% 51% 38%
Italy 64,625 3% 4% 84% 8%
Source: Eurostat, migration and migrant population statistics; asylum statistics.
Unfortunately, such precise information is not gathered for refugees. What is known is 
that asylum seekers from outside the EU are much younger than economic migrants already 
located in Europe, and that males are overrepresented compared to females, although this 
can vary greatly in destination countries (Table 2). The lack of more accurate information 
about refugees’ skills is partly a result of the extremely difficult conditions at frontline refugee 
5 For instance, in the case of Syria, out of approximately 6 million refugees, 45 percent live in Turkey and only 15 
percent reached Europe, with most in Germany and Serbia.  
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reception centres. It can also be extremely difficult to verify the information collected at 
registration, and to confirm the authenticity of original documents when they are provided. 
However, there might also be political concerns in the destination countries, because having 
precise information about the education, skills, qualifications and professions of refugees 
might increase the fears of natives of labour market competition.
National responses 
The differences in the responses of European countries to the refugee crisis are stark, espe-
cially if one considers that already in 2001 the EU adopted a directive laying down common 
standards for member countries in the case of a massive influx of refugees (2001/55/EC).  
Furthermore, a second directive, in 2005 (2005/85/EC), set out common procedural guaran-
tees for asylum procedures, including for example rights to a personal interview, to appeal 
decisions and to receive information on the outcome of asylum claims. This directive has 
since been replaced by the Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU), mentioned in the 
introduction.
In the current refugee crisis, Germany stands out as the main recipient of asylum requests 
with 61 percent of total applications made to EU countries. Germany was followed by Italy (8 
percent), France (6 percent), Austria (5 percent) and the United Kingdom (4 percent). These 
five countries account for more than 80 percent of all first-time applicants filing applications 
in EU countries in 2015 (Eurostat, 2017). 
Figure 3 shows that there are significant differences in the behaviour of the five countries 
when taking decisions on asylum applications. Austria and Germany register the highest 
acceptance rates by far (77 percent and 68 percent of total asylum requests, respectively). Italy 
and UK have much lower acceptance rates, around 33 percent of total requests, followed by 
France, which in the first quarter of 2016 conceded refugee status to less than 30 percent of 
total asylum seekers. 
There are notable differences also in the type of status assigned to refugees. In Germany, 
the vast majority of accepted asylum seekers were given refugee status under the umbrella of 
the Geneva Convention. In Italy, France and Austria, roughly 9-12 percent of asylum seekers 
were given subsidiary protection status, meaning they did not qualify as refugees but were 
still considered to face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to their home coun-
tries6. In Italy and the UK, a different status, humanitarian status, meaning authorisation to 
stay was given for humanitarian reasons, was granted to 19 percent and 5 percent of asylum 
seekers, respectively.
 These differences might be in part a consequence of the different nationalities of refugees 
in the different destination countries. For example, 90 percent of all Syrian refugees asked for 
asylum in Germany7, and the acceptance rate was close to 99 percent for Syrians, followed by 
Eritreans (94 percent) and Iraqis (73 percent). Acceptance rates for refugees from other coun-
tries were much lower, and other nationalities mainly went to different destination countries. 
For instance, acceptance rates for refugees from non-EU European countries were extremely 
low: of the 15,300 first instance decisions issued to Albanians, only 400 were positive (or a 
3 percent rate of recognition). Similarly, only 1 percent and 3 percent of the final decisions 
issued, respectively, to Serbians and Kosovars were positive (all data from Eurostat, 2016). 
6 EU Directive 2011/95/EU (the Qualification Directive) gives precise definitions of terms that relate to the status 
of refugees and others eligible for protection; see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=O-
J:L:2011:337:0009:0026:en:PDF.
7 Germany agreed to suspend Dublin regulations for refugees from Syria, meaning that these could directly appeal 
to Germany for recognition.
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Figure 3: First instance decisions on asylum applications, first quarter 2016, 
selected countries
Source: Eurostat (2016).
However, even taking into account the different flows of refugees to destination countries, 
the differences between EU countries is still remarkable. A 2010 UN Refugee Agency report 
covering 12 EU countries, for example, found numerous differences in the way they assessed 
asylum applications8. The study concluded that EU countries apply the Asylum Procedures 
Directive (2013/32/EU) in diverging ways, and in some cases, in ways that might breach 
international law.
Challenges 
What are the factors behind these differences in how countries deal with asylum claims? One 
major issue in dealing more uniformly with the growing migratory flows is that the EU is made 
up of structurally diverse countries that are subject to opposing political and social incentives 
and which retain full sovereignty over, and full responsibility for, migration policy.
A first difference is the societal perception in different countries of the contribution of 
immigrants to the culture and the economy of their country of residence. These perceptions 
are well described by cross-country survey data from the European Social Survey 2008-2012, 
which gauges the extent of agreement with one of two statements: “a country’s culture is 
undermined or enriched by immigrants” and to the statement “immigration is good for the 
economy of the country” (see http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/). The OECD report Indi-
cators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In further shows how unequal and divergent 
societal judgements about immigrants’ cultural contribution are (Figure 4). 
Generally speaking, continental European and Nordic societies (eg German, Swiss, 
Danish, Finnish, Swedish) display more positive attitudes towards immigration. By contrast, 
people have relatively more negative attitudes towards immigrants in several southern Euro-
pean countries (eg Greece, Cyprus) and central/eastern European countries (eg the Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Slovakia), where less than 30 percent of respondents positively evaluate the 
8 The countries covered by the analysis were Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. See UNHCR (2010).
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cultural impact of immigrants. Economic evaluations of the impact of immigrants are less 
polarised, but countries rank similarly. 
 Figure 4: Perceived cultural impact (upper panel) and economic impact (lower 
panel) of immigrants, by country
Source: Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In, OECD, based on data from the European Social Survey, 2008 (http://www.
europeansocialsurvey.org/).
Given differing cultural attitudes, it is perhaps not surprising that best practices in wel-
come, support and integration policies, tend to come from Nordic and continental European 
countries. For example, Norway is one of the countries that make the greatest efforts to 
provide early support. The Norwegian government offers up to 250 hours of language training 
to asylum seekers when they are still in the reception centres. This kind of early intervention is 
likely to be very effective, considerably cutting the time-to-first-job of those who will stay and 
start a new working life there. Along similar lines, the Danish ‘Step-model’ policy gradually 
leads new arrivals and longer-term immigrants into regular employment via intensive lan-
guage training, an introduction to the workplace and subsidised initial employment, which 
can be combined with further on-the-job language training and up-skilling.
Sweden is one of the best performers when it comes to policies to prevent/reduce the risk 
of segregation of refugees. Immigrants in Sweden are carefully surveyed and their overall 
profiles identified, and they are matched to localities based on their individual characteris-
tics, including their education levels and work experience. Similarly, Germany introduced 
an ‘early intervention’ scheme to assess the professional skills and abilities of asylum seekers 
through samples of their work, building on their declared work history.
Less farsighted seem to be the integration policies that are implemented in Mediterranean 
European countries. A typical case is Italy, where the dominant model is one of “molecular 
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integration” (Censis, 2016). After an initial allocation of refugees carried out by the central 
government, integration policies are left to local communities, which differ in terms of sensi-
tivities and resources. 
A second critical factor is the costs of emergency response and its impact on the public 
finances of EU countries. There have been only limited attempts up to now to quantify these 
costs. However, short-term expenditure required to provide support to asylum seekers can 
be substantial9. Costs can range from about €10 per day for single adults housed in recep-
tion centres to more than €300 for those without accommodation. Typically, the total cost of 
processing and accommodating asylum seekers can be in the range of €8,000 to €12,000 per 
application for the first year, although the figure may be much lower for fast-track processing 
(see OECD, 2015a). 
It follows that, in the absence of well-functioning coordination mechanisms, the burden of 
the welcome process weighs more on the countries exposed to the arrival of asylum seekers. 
Moreover, if the European Commission’s plan to relocate refugees does not work because of 
the refusal of some EU countries to accept them, a further need to compensate the recipient 
countries would arise. As already mentioned, Germany, Italy, Austria, France and the UK 
alone account for more than 80 percent of all first-time applicants in the EU. The Commission 
has already stepped up the resources it targets to refugees by €200 million for 2015 and €300 
million for 2016, but this covers only emergencies, not future integration policy10, 11. 
Dealing with refugees
Although there is no simple way to manage refugee inflows, the importance of designing 
policies that favour the integration of refugees from the very beginning is amply recognised 
by international organisations (eg OECD, UNHCR). Refugee inflows can bring benefits to the 
economies and societies of developed countries if integration policies are well designed and 
effectively implemented. 
First, long waiting times should be avoided, particularly for those asylum seekers that are 
more likely to stay. Time that refugees spend waiting reduces their chances of integration. 
Conversely, refugees should be provided as soon as possible with language training and 
integration support, eg skills assessments and civic integration courses. Refugees should be 
legally entitled to find a job, soon after their arrival in the destination country, while bureau-
cratic costs should be reduced. Not working can have detrimental effects on the ability of 
refugees to integrate, as their skills may deteriorate in the medium-run. 
The second challenge is to prevent segregation of refugees. This can be avoided through 
thoughtful and well-designed allocation across the country. Allocation should include 
an assessment of the types of jobs available in a particular region that match the skills of 
migrants. The availability of housing is another important ingredient. Allocation to regions/
areas with good housing availability helps to reduce the risk of social segregation. Generally 
speaking, it is important to promote equal access to integration services for asylum seekers 
across the country and to offset as much as possible regional differences in levels of support. 
If the levels of support vary drastically in different regions, refugees’ integration prospects are 
determined by which part of the country they are settled in. Also, it is important to make sure 
9 This includes humanitarian assistance to deliver food and shelter and basic income support; up-front expenditure 
associated with language training and schooling; steps to identify the skills of migrants and expenditure associated 
with processing asylum claims and enforcing returns. Monthly allowances provided to asylum seekers vary signifi-
cantly between countries and according to housing conditions.
10 The deal with Turkey also implied transferring €6 billion in refugee aid.
11 The Commission has also set up emergency funding. This has already provided resources to Greece and Balkan 
countries. In February 2016, Austria too asked for extra emergency funding.
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that foreign qualifications and work experience count in the country of destination. Local 
employers often discount and dismiss foreign qualifications and work experience, with the 
result that qualified refugees often struggle to secure jobs appropriate to their levels of expe-
rience. This is compounded because many flee their home countries with no proof of their 
qualifications. National authorities can help here by assessing and documenting newcomers’ 
education, skills and experiences. 
The third challenge is to pay early attention to vulnerable refugees. These include, for 
example, unaccompanied minors who arrive around the age at which compulsory schooling 
ends (14-17) but have little or no formal education, and need specific, appropriate support in 
order to catch up and integrate12. Also very vulnerable are refugees with mental and physical 
health issues. Health problems hinder a migrant’s ability to get a job, learn the local language, 
interact with public institutions and acquire education. All these factors reduce the proba-
bility of successful integration in the country of destination. Refugees are particularly prone 
to mental health issues such as anxiety and depression, following their often traumatic and 
violent experiences back home and in flight. Host countries should assess the mental health 
of newcomers alongside physical evaluations, grant refugees access to regular healthcare and 
ensure they are able to make use of it.
The fourth challenge is the long-term monitoring of the integration of refugees. Integra-
tion can take a long time, particularly for people with low levels of education. While long-term 
support is expensive, it pays off in the long run, even benefiting the refugees’ offspring who 
might have integration problems themselves. It is important that the monitoring and inte-
gration support effort is not left to governments alone. Civil society, eg employers, charities, 
immigrant associations, community-based organisations and trade unions, should work with 
the government to integrate refugees. Such organisations should cooperate in the imple-
mentation of government policies, develop effective mentorship programmes, help with the 
appraisal of refugees’ skills and in welcoming newcomers to the community. 
The Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU) tries to address many of these issues, as its 
objective is to create a coherent and more efficient system. However, as the directive has only 
applied since July 2015, it is difficult to gauge so far whether it has been effective in harmonis-
ing national asylum procedures. Carrying out an accurate evaluation is going to be one of the 
main challenges for the EU in the next few years.
A European approach 
The lack of a single European policy on immigration implies that countries that have diverse 
needs, and that retain full sovereignty and accountability for migration policy, adopt positions 
and make choices on immigration based only on their perceived national interests. This might 
be at the expense of other countries. This is an example of a typical externalities problem 
studied in the economic literature: countries make choices without taking into account the 
spillover effects of their policies on other countries, and the result might be inherently inef-
ficient for Europe as a whole. Differences in national refugee policies distort the functioning 
of European labour markets and create massive incentives for refugees to seek asylum in 
specific countries rather than others. Lack of harmonisation also violates some founding EU 
principles, such as the existence of a common European policy on the mobility of people. 
On 7 June 2016, the European Commission announced a Migration Partnership Frame-
12 An example is the US Unaccompanied Refugee Minors programme, which provides intensive case management by 
social workers, educational support, English language training, career and educational counselling, mental health 
care and social integration support. 
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work to reinforce EU action in dealing with external work on managing migration13.  This 
initiative seems to head in the right direction. It recognises that immigration policy cannot be 
left in the hands of national governments, but must be Europe-wide. Interestingly, 68 percent 
of the European population agrees that there should be a common policy on immigration 
(Eurobarometer, 2015). The lack of a common migration policy is more the outcome of low 
political and legislative integration between EU member states than the result of a lack of 
consensus among European citizens. The need for an integrated approach covers four main 
aspects: economic migration, asylum, the integration of third-country nationals and partner-
ships with non-EU countries. Such an integrated approach is difficult to implement because, 
in the current incomplete stage of European integration, it raises issues of legality and the 
legitimacy of supranational policymaking at EU level relative to the member states’ obliga-
tions under, for example, the UN 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees.
In these respects, the main advantage of the proposed Partnership Framework lies in the 
suggestion of the need for a common European approach to immigration. In particular, the 
proposal recognises that migratory flows experienced in recent years are unprecedented, but 
also that they are likely to last for decades, given the economic and demographic differences 
between Europe and its neighbouring continents. Acknowledging this implies that the strat-
egy to face these challenges must be innovative and long-term. 
Two points are of fundamental importance in a migration partnership framework: the 
need for shared control of the external borders of the EU and for harmonised treatment of 
asylum requests. Both these elements are essential parts of coordinated decision-making by 
EU countries. They eliminate incentives for countries of entry to not police the border, and 
prevent destination countries from using too strict requirements for asylum in order to dis-
courage requests. Europe has taken some steps over both issues, such the agreement on the 
Asylum Procedures Directive, although its implementation is still to be evaluated. In terms of 
border control, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, established in October 2016, 
will have the right to intervene even without a member state request in urgent situations that 
put the functioning of the Schengen area at risk. We will see how this plays out in the future. 
But there is also the need to further harmonise integration policies, in line with the best prac-
tises we have discussed. The challenge is for the EU to play a central role in these respects. 
Calling for coordinated decision-making at EU level acknowledges that EU states should give 
up some national sovereignty. 
Another important point is the idea of  cooperation with the countries of origin of immi-
grants and refugees. It is clearly impossible to handle refugee inflows, and future flows of 
immigrants, by looking at them only as internal problems for Europe, without trying to under-
stand what happens in the countries of origin. How can this cooperation be enhanced?
One option would be to start new relationships with the main countries of origin, based on 
the ‘more-for-more principle’14. This principle has already proved to be effective in the past, 
for example in the EU’s relationship with eastern Europe. Trade liberalisation between the EU 
and countries of origin could also be favoured in exchange for closer bilateral cooperation in 
the management of flows.
Appropriate funding needs to be ensured for European measures on refugees. As we have 
discussed, the European Union is already funding some initiatives and supporting some 
member countries with specific resources, but most of the burden of welcoming refugees is 
carried by the member countries themselves. Clearly, the more that refugees’ welcome policy 
becomes a European policy, the more there is an argument for a greater share of funding 
being found at the European level. In particular, long-term and costly policies to support 
origin countries would require adequate funding at European level. Thus, there is some 
13 See European Commission press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2072_en.htm.
14 Under this principle, the EU agrees to develop stronger partnerships with those neighbouring countries that make 
more progress towards democratic reform (European Commission, 2013). 
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merit in the proposals, aired in different contexts by countries such as Italy and Germany, to 
introduce a specific and permanent tax, the proceeds of which would be reserved to finance 
welcome and integration policies in European countries, and policies to support origin coun-
tries according to the more-for-more principle. The tax proceeds could be used, for example, 
as collateral for loans and investment in the origin countries. This would be a clear indication 
that migration is a primary theme of European Union policy. 
Another challenge is to start an effective European-level process for evaluation of refugees’ 
skills and competences to guide integration policy. As already stressed, there is remarkably 
little information on these issues. It is striking that in spite of all the debate, there is no Euro-
pean-wide framework for evaluating the skills of immigrants, or collecting information about 
their skills and qualifications on a regular basis.  
Conclusions
Although it is difficult to achieve, an overall common European approach to the refugee crisis 
appears essential. Border control, security and harmonised management of refugees are 
obvious public goods for an integrated area such as the EU. It is very unlikely that national 
authorities acting independently could offer these public goods efficiently; the differences 
between European countries in terms of their policies to welcome and integrate refugees 
demonstrates this. In a common European approach, EU countries would share with the 
European Union sovereignty over migration policy. This is obviously a very difficult objective 
to reach at the current stage of European integration. However, failing to provide these public 
goods would weaken European social cohesion and the general political consensus behind 
the European project. 
Further attempts to share the burden of refugee inflows between EU countries should be 
pursued. For instance, if there is insufficient consensus to revise the Dublin Regulation, and 
if furthermore there is no consensus on relocation of refugees, then adequate financial sup-
port must be given to first-entry countries, to underpin both their welcome and integration 
policies. Ensuring long-term funding is crucial. Based on the example of the European Social 
Fund, a European integration fund should be capitalised with adequate funds to promote 
full integration of those individuals and families accepted as refugees by EU member states. 
Integration policies should take into account the characteristics of refugees in terms of skills, 
education and more general cultural characteristics, because these factors also affect the cost 
of integration policies. 
Finally, there is little doubt that difficulties in addressing the refugee crisis have more to do 
with political and ideological resistance than with resources. There is already public resist-
ance to immigration, from inside and outside the EU, and less willingness to accept further 
flows of foreigners, who often have very different cultural features from natives. This puts 
pressure on governments, particularly in countries where there is already very little accept-
ance of immigration. There is probably limited room for manoeuvre in this respect. Rather 
than attempting to relocate refugees to these countries, it is probably more pragmatic to ask 
for compensation from the countries that do not want refugees. 
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